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EMPLOYMENT LAW—A UNION’S DUTY OF




PILOT SENIORITY CLAIMS are some of the most vehe-mently contested and highly sensitive duty of fair representa-
tion claims throughout the airline industry.1 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that a union’s duty of fair representation
is a “statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its dis-
cretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbi-
trary conduct.”2 Additionally, “a union’s actions are arbitrary
only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of
the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide
range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational.”3 By holding that
the US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA) breached its duty of
fair representation in Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n,4 the
Ninth Circuit incorrectly reversed the decision of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona. The Ninth Circuit’s hold-
ing was incorrect, especially in light of the clear error standard
of review, because (1) incorporation of Paragraph 10(h) of the
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Contingent Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement (MOU) was crucial in order to solid-
ify ratification of the MOU; and (2) the America West Airlines,
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; B.A. in Political Science
and Russian Language, Literature, and Culture, magna cum laude with honors
distinction, Syracuse University, 2014. The author would like to thank the SMU
Law Review Association for their guidance in publishing this casenote, as well as
her family and Justin for their continued support.
1 See Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, 791 F.3d 967, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2015)
(Addington II).
2 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
3 Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
4 791 F.3d at 967.
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Inc. pilots’ (West Pilots) involvement in the MOU negotiations
and voting results indicated vast support from West Pilots for the
ratification of the MOU.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
US Airways merged with America West Airlines in 2005,6 and
the resulting seniority negotiation between their pilots is best
described as a ten-year “bitter seniority dispute.”7 The US Air-
ways pilots (East Pilots) and the West Pilots were both repre-
sented by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) when the
airlines merged.8 The East Pilots, West Pilots, and ALPA Transi-
tion Agreement stated that the new seniority list would take ef-
fect when the following transpired: “(1) US Airways obtained a
single operating certificate (this occurred in 2007); (2) the two
pilot groups created a single seniority list . . . ; and (3) the pilots
and the new airline negotiated a Single Agreement.”9 Until all
three requirements were fulfilled, the East and West pilots’ sepa-
rate seniority lists would remain effective.10
There were 5,100 East Pilots and only 1,900 West Pilots, but
America West “was a newer and financially stronger airline . . .
[with] better wages and greater job security.”11 Throughout ne-
gotiations, the East Pilots’ proposal urged for seniority based on
date of hire and would place a number of West Pilots at the
bottom of the seniority list, even below furloughed East Pilots.12
The West Pilots’ proposal advocated for the seniority list to re-
flect the strength of the pilot’s pre-merger airline and would
give less deference to date of hire and instead focus on “pilot
rank and career prospects.”13 After the East and West pilots’ ne-
gotiations failed, an arbitration panel (Nicolau Arbitration) in-
corporated both parties’ demands, but did not adopt a single
proposal in its entirety, when it placed 500 East Pilots at the top
of the list and the 1,700 furloughed East Pilots at the bottom of
the list (Nicolau Award).14 Displeased with the Nicolau Award,
5 Id. at 994–98 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 970 (majority opinion).
7 Id. at 971.
8 Id. at 970.
9 Id. at 972.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 971–72.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 972.
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the East Pilots used their majority numbers to establish and elect
a new union, the U.S. Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), which
would base seniority on a pilot’s date of hire and, thus, relocate
West Pilots to the bottom of the seniority list.15
In 2008, the West Pilots sued USAPA for breach of its duty of
fair representation, and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona ruled in favor of the West Pilots.16 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit dismissed the case because it was not yet justiciable.17 US
Airways then filed a declaratory judgment action in 2010 against
both the West Pilots and USAPA, “seeking guidance as to
whether it could be held liable for assisting in a breach of
USAPA’s duty of fair representation if it entered into a collective
bargaining agreement that did not implement the Nicolau
Award.”18 The district court held that (1) USAPA was bound by
the Transition Agreement, but the Agreement could be modi-
fied if there was a consensus between USAPA and US Airways;
and (2) USAPA’s “seniority proposal [did] not breach its duty of
fair representation provided it [was] supported by a legitimate
union purpose.”19
In 2012, US Airways and American Airlines agreed to pursue a
merger.20 Both airlines and their respective unions, USAPA
(represented by a committee consisting of two West Pilots and
two East Pilots), and the Allied Pilots Association (APA) negoti-
ated the MOU.21 The contested section of the MOU, which was
proposed by USAPA, is Paragraph 10(h), and it states: “US Air-
ways agrees that neither this Memorandum nor the Joint Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement shall provide a basis for changing
the seniority lists currently in effect at US Airways other than
through the process set forth in the McCaskill–Bond Amend-
ment.”22 USAPA tailored its MOU presentations to its particular
audiences when educating pilots on the negotiated proposal
and urging its ratification.23 When standing before the West Pi-
15 Id. at 973.
16 Id. at 973–74 (citing Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. CV 08–1633,
2009 WL 2169164, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2009)).
17 Id. at 974 (citing Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, 606 F.3d 1174, 1179
(9th Cir. 2010)).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 974–75 (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Addington, No. CV 10-01570, 2012
WL 5996936, at *4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 11, 2012)).
20 Id. at 975.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 976.
23 Id.
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lots, USAPA described the MOU as “neutral with respect to se-
niority.”24 However, before the East Pilots the USAPA said the
MOU was “beneficial because, in effect, it confirmed that the
Nicolau Award was dead.”25 Nevertheless, both the East and
West Pilots recognized that the MOU had economic incentives
for all pilots, specifically pay increases.26 The MOU was later rati-
fied, and “[o]f the 1,041 West Pilots who voted, 1,017 voted in
favor of the MOU.”27
Later, in 2013 some of the West Pilots filed suit claiming that,
among other things, USAPA breached its duty of fair representa-
tion when it ignored its obligation to implement the Nicolau
Award.28 The district court held that USAPA did have a legiti-
mate union purpose for entering into the MOU because “[a]
rational person could conclude that making the MOU explicitly
neutral served the legitimate union purpose of securing the ad-
ditional compensation contained in the MOU while putting off
to another day the question of the appropriate seniority
regime.”29
III. APPELLATE DECISION
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s
judgment and held that Paragraph 10(h) was incorporated into
the MOU with only the intent of benefiting the East Pilots at the
expense of the West Pilots because it made the Nicolau Award
unenforceable and, thus, was not a legitimate union purpose.30
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred because (1)
there was no evidence in the record indicating that Paragraph
10(h) was incorporated in exchange for economic benefits for
both East and West Pilots; (2) the district court could not rely
on USAPA’s argument that Paragraph 10(h) was added to avoid
further conflict because the East Pilots, through USAPA, created
the conflict itself; and (3) USAPA’s motive to ensure that the




26 Id. at 975–76.
27 Id. at 976.
28 Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. CV 13–00471, 2014 WL 321349, at
*6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2014) (Addington I) (unpublished).
29 Id. at *7.
30 Addington II, 791 F.3d at 989–90.
31 Id. at 988–90.
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In support of its argument, a majority of the Ninth Circuit
cited Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB.32 In Barton Brands, Glencoe
and Barton agreed to dovetail their seniority lists, but after Bar-
ton’s expansion plans fell through, the union reconfigured the
seniority list to place all Glencoe employees below Barton em-
ployees.33 The Seventh Circuit held that the union breached its
duty of fair representation because it “acted solely on the
grounds of political expediency in reducing the former Glencoe
employees’ seniority . . . [and] such decisions may not be made
solely for the benefit of a stronger, more politically favored group
over a minority group.”34
Additionally, the court relied on Bernard v. Air Line Pilots
Ass’n.35 There, the court held that the union breached its duty
of fair representation by not allowing Jet America Airlines pilots
to partake in the union negotiations with Alaska Airlines after
the two airlines merged and by not following its own merger
policy.36
However, the dissent in Addington advocated for affirming the
district court’s finding because “of the deference [the] court
owes to USAPA as the then-certified bargaining representative,
and to the district court as finder of fact,” especially in light of
the “clear error” standard of review.37 First, the dissent recog-
nized that neither the USAPA, nor the district court, stated that
Paragraph 10(h) was incorporated directly in turn for a pay in-
crease.38 Instead, the dissent highlighted that “USAPA could not
secure additional compensation for its employees if it could not
get the MOU ratified, and it could not get the MOU ratified if
the MOU implicated the seniority issues that had divided
USAPA’s membership since 2007.”39 Additionally, the dissent as-
serted that USAPA inherited the seniority dispute, and “[h]ad
USAPA’s leadership decided to support the Nicolau Award, they
had every reason to believe they would have been voted out like
ALPA before them.”40 Lastly, the dissent emphasized that
32 Id. at 985 (citing Barton Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir.
1976)).
33 Barton Brands, Ltd., 529 F.2d at 795–96.
34 Id. at 798–99.
35 Addington II, 791 F.3d at 985 (citing Bernard v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 873
F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1989)).
36 Id. (citing Bernard, 873 F.2d at 216).
37 Id. at 994 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 995.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 997.
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USAPA designated two East Pilots and two West Pilots to serve as
representatives while negotiating the MOU.41 Also, 97.69% of
the West Pilots who voted favored ratification of the MOU.42
IV. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court because (1) incorporation of Paragraph 10(h) was
crucial in order to solidify ratification of the MOU; and (2) the
West Pilots’ involvement in the MOU negotiations, as well as the
voting results, indicated vast support from West Pilots for the
ratification of the MOU, thus showing that USAPA had a legiti-
mate purpose in entering the MOU. Under a duty of fair repre-
sentation claim, a plaintiff must show that the union’s action was
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”43 Arbitrariness under
a claim concerning a seniority list is found when a union or-
ganizes the seniority list with the sole intent to advance one
group over another.44 “[B]argaining has winners and losers, and
the losers cannot prove a breach of duty of fair representation
merely by showing that they were disadvantaged by the ultimate
result.”45 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that
a union’s role in the context of a duty of fair representation
claim is comparable to that of the legislature; some deference
must be given to the union.46 Lastly, “a ‘bad’ motive does not
spoil a collective bargaining agreement that rationally serves the
interests of workers as a whole.”47 “[S]o long as a Court can find
[that] some legitimate union purpose motivat[ed] a seniority
change, the union has not breached its duty of fair
representation.”48
When applying the clear error standard of review, the appel-
late court must defer to the decision of the lower court unless,
when analyzing the record in its entirety, the reviewing court has
a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. CV 13–00471, 2014 WL 321349, at
*6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2014) (Addington I) (unpublished).
44 Addington II, 791 F.3d at 984 (majority opinion) (citing Rakestraw v. United
Airlines, Inc., 981 F.2d 1524, 1535 (7th Cir. 1992)).
45 Addington I, 2014 WL 321349, at *6 (citing Rakestraw, 981 F.2d at 1530).
46 See Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75 (1991).
47 Addington I, 2014 WL 321349, at *6 (citing Rakestraw, 981 F.2d at 1535).
48 Id.
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ted.”49 If the lower court’s analysis is plausible when examining
all of the evidence, it cannot be clearly erroneous.50
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court because incorporation of Paragraph 10(h) was crucial
to solidify ratification of the MOU.51 The dissent emphasized
that the language of Paragraph 10(h) was neutral and did not
favor either side.52 The West Pilots wanted the Nicolau Award to
be implemented, and the East Pilots wanted all pilots ranked
based on their date of hire.53 Paragraph 10(h) did neither.54 In
order to secure the proposed pay increases for all pilots, USAPA
needed to negotiate a draft of the MOU that would have been
well received by East and West Pilots alike.55 USAPA “could not
get the MOU ratified if the MOU implicated seniority issues that
had divided USAPA’s membership since 2007.”56
USAPA did not breach its duty of fair representation because
unlike in Barton, the MOU was not negotiated for the sole pur-
pose of advancing the East Pilots’ interests.57 Even a West Pilot
conceded that the MOU negotiations required “give and take.”58
Specifically, “the MOU required the East Pilots give up a benefi-
cial ‘change in control’ provision that would have granted the
East Pilots––and the East Pilots only––a temporary increase in
compensation.”59 Instead, the MOU provided both the East Pi-
lots and West Pilots with pay increases.60
The language of Paragraph 10(h) mandated that the East Pi-
lots and West Pilots existing and separate seniority lists remain
in effect until there was a final integration of all US Airways and
American Airlines pilots.61 The district court, as the fact-finder,
held that “[a] rational person could conclude that making the
MOU explicitly neutral served the legitimate union purpose of
49 Addington II, 791 F.3d at 995 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (quoting SEC v.
Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003)).
50 Id. (citing Rubera, 350 F.3d at 1093–94).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 996.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 995.
56 Id.
57 Compare Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. CV 13–00471, 2014 WL
321349, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2014) (Addington I) (unpublished), with Barton
Brands, Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1976).
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securing the additional compensation contained in the MOU
while putting off to another day the question of the appropriate
seniority regime.”62 The court further noted, “[t]he fact that
USAPA might have, in truth, been motivated by a desire to
weaken the chances of eventual adoption of the Nicolau Award
is not enough.”63
Lastly, the West Pilots involvement in the MOU negotiations,
as well as the voting results, indicated that the MOU was in-
tended to be neutral.64 Unlike in Bernard, two West Pilots and
two East Pilots represented the USAPA throughout the MOU
negotiations––the East Pilots were not given any additional rep-
resentation or negotiating advantage.65 And, “[o]f the 1,041
West Pilots who voted, 1,017 voted in favor of the MOU.”66 Of
the West Pilots who voted, 97.69% favored ratification of the
MOU,67 showing that the majority of West Pilots believed that
USAPA had a legitimate purpose in entering the MOU.
Seniority is crucial to pilots because it determines their pay,
working conditions, the aircraft they fly, and their work sched-
ules, and it also determines their likelihood of exposure to fur-
loughs.68 Because the pilots with the lowest seniority ranking are
typically the first to be furloughed, “seniority can therefore
mean the difference between being in or out of a job.”69 Pilot
seniority ranking is undoubtedly “a zero-sum game, where mov-
ing one pilot up the list necessarily requires moving another pi-
lot down.”70 As a result, “a winners-and-losers compromise does
not mean that the union has violated its duty of fair representa-
tion.”71 The Ninth Circuit’s holding has drastically limited a
union’s ability to manage seniority ranking disputes in the wake
of airline mergers. A losing minority numbered group can al-
ways argue that the union acted in bad faith and planned for
them to lose.72 In fact, the Seventh Circuit in Rakestraw empha-
62 Id.
63 Id. at *7–8 (citing Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 981 F.2d 1524, 1535
(7th Cir. 1992)).
64 Id. at *3.
65 Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, 791 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2015) (Add-
ington II).
66 Id. at 976.
67 Id. at 997 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 980 (majority opinion).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 983.
72 Rakestraw v. United Airlines, Inc., 981 F.2d 1524, 1531 (7th Cir. 1992).
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sized the potential ramifications that could arise by giving too
much deference to this assertion when it warned:
Taken to its limits, the approach prevents the union from resolv-
ing differences internally and representing the interests of work-
ers as a group. Yet one of the premises of the Railway Labor Act
. . . is that unions act democratically to reach a collective deci-
sion—the majority is entitled to prevail.73
The Ninth Circuit did not give enough deference to USAPA in
its role as representative of the East and West Pilots or to the
district court in its role as fact-finder, especially under the clear
error standard of review. Nevertheless, on August 24, 2015, a
majority of the Ninth Circuit panel judges denied USAPA’s peti-
tion for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc.74
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court because USAPA had a legitimate purpose in propos-
ing Paragraph 10(h) of the MOU as its incorporation was
crucial to solidify ratification and increase all pilots’ compensa-
tion, and the West Pilots involvement in the negotiations, as well
as the voting results, indicate vast support for the ratification of
the MOU. The language of, and negotiations behind the incor-
poration of, Paragraph 10(h) highlight that USAPA at the very
least had some legitimate purpose behind proposing and pro-
moting the ratification of the MOU. Thus, USAPA did not
breach its duty of fair representation.
73 Id.
74 Addington v. US Airline Pilots Ass’n, No. 14–15757, 2015 WL 5157138, at *1
(9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
